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ABSTRACT 
 
The main objective of this study is to determine the attitudes of school principals 
regarding a performance based compensation system.  This study identifies the attitudes 
towards specific factors that should be considered in the implementation of a system of 
performance based compensation.  The data have been analyzed to determine if a 
principal’s demographic characteristics affect his/her level of agreement with 
performance based compensation and the factors for implementation.  In addition, this 
study unveils areas of concern that principals have conveyed regarding the 
implementation of a performance based compensation system.   
Data was obtained from 444 public school principals representing 444 schools 
and 178 districts in the state of Colorado.  Measures used in the treatment of the data 
include descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA.  The major findings of this study 
were: 
1. 82.4% of respondents believe that teachers, principals and administrators 
should be included in performance based compensation (PBC). 
2. The top two indicators that respondents believed should be included in a PBC 
system are student achievement (88.5%) and teacher evaluations (77.6%) 




a. The capacity to link student achievement to teacher evaluations 
(82.9%) 
b. Teacher Union Resistance (67.1%) 
c. Cost (55.9%) 
4. Principals in urban, rural and suburban geographic groups disagree about the 
effects of performance based compensation. 
5. The top 5 overall concerns regarding Performance Based Compensation were: 
a. Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure 
performance of all teachers/equity between teachers 
b. Concerns regarding evaluation (time for principals to learn, 
consistency from school to school, time for principals to evaluate, 
quality of evaluation tool). 
c. Not in favor of PBC due to philosophical views or concerns about lack 
of research. 
d. Concerns regarding the equity between classrooms and districts across 
the state due to poverty levels and unequal resources. 
e. Concerns that performance based compensation will result in a decline 
in teacher collaboration and an increase in competition between 
teachers. 
Based upon these findings, the researcher concluded that there is not a strong general 
acceptance of performance based compensation systems.  However, urban principals in 




rural areas.  Most importantly, systems to link student achievement to teacher evaluation 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Critics of public education claim today that public education system is broken; 
that schools and teachers are failing.  Public school is being examined and calls for 
reform are at an all time high.  The reforms called for are grounded in past educational 
theory, business theory and assumptions of  “the problem”.  Research tells us that the 
number one factor in student achievement is an effective teacher; therefore we must not 
have enough effective teachers if the system is failing.  Systems that reward teachers 
based on performance are not new.  However, current reform initiatives suggest that these 
performance based compensation structures should be revised and used as a way of 
holding teachers accountable for the academic results of their students. The premise of 
performance based compensation originally came from the business world, but if it is 
going to be used effectively in public education it is important to understand the attitudes 
that teachers, principals and administrators have regarding such systems of pay. 
Although the United States Constitution provides each state with authority to 
control their own educational systems, beginning in 1958 national policy makers and 
politicians have used their authority to create policies during times of perceived 
educational crisis.  These perceived times of crisis have been presented through reports 
such as the National Defense Education Act, the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Act, 
the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act and A Nation at Risk.  The United 
States current administration is no different.  Most recently the American Recovery and 
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Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided funding that was targeted to improve state 
and local education systems through the Race to the Top grant.  According to Michael 
Shear and Nick Anderson with the Washington Post, President Barrack Obama has used 
the $4 million provided by ARRA to strong arm the education establishment to accept 
more charter schools and performance pay for teachers.  Knowing that student success is 
dependent on an effective teacher (Jamil, Anwar, & Sultana, 2012) , the current 
administration believes that effective teachers should be rewarded and ineffective 
teachers should either be mentored so that they improve or guided out of the profession.  
President Obama and Education Secretary Arne Duncan have made it clear that the Race 
to the Top money will be distributed to the states that, among other criteria, demonstrate 
a system for tying student achievement to teacher performance (Shear & Anderson, 
2009). 
According to the U.S. Department of Education, the Race to the Top Fund is a 
competitive grant program designed to encourage and reward states that are creating the 
conditions for education innovation and reform; achieving significant improvement in 
student outcomes, including making substantial gains in student achievement, closing 
achievement gaps, improving high school graduation rates, and ensuring student 
preparation for success in college and careers; and implementing ambitious plans in four 
core education reform areas (Learning Point Associates, 2010).   
The Race to the Top emphasis in the core area of recruiting, developing, 
rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and principals has already begun to influence 
state and local policies related to teacher evaluation, teacher compensation and 
performance pay systems.  Although the Race to the Top Grant applications from state 
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education departments showed a wide variety of readiness in regards to implementing an 
evaluation system for teachers based on teacher effectiveness and performance, all 41 
grant applications shared a timeline that would lead their state to new systems of 
evaluation.  Many state education agencies are currently revising their policies regarding 
teacher qualification and effectiveness. In fact, many states are defining teacher 
effectiveness and creating new systems for teacher evaluation that are drastically 
different than the evaluation systems of the past.  These evaluation systems focus on the 
use of student achievement data as a strong measure of teacher success.  For example, in 
the state of Colorado the Educator Effectiveness Council, organized by Governor Bill 
Ritter, made the recommendation that fifty percent of a teacher’s evaluation should be 
determined by student growth measures (The State Council for Educator Effectiveness, 
2011). 
In addition to an emphasis on new teacher and principal evaluation systems, the 
Race to the Top grant also encourages states to compensate teachers and principals in 
new ways related to their effectiveness (Smarick, 2010).  Coupled with teacher evaluation 
systems, performance based compensation is one of the most talked about and 
controversial topics in education today.  There is growing parent and community support 
for a system of pay that recognizes teachers for working with students that show 
academic achievement and growth. In the state of Colorado, the creation of a 
performance based evaluation system will be finalized and implemented statewide for 
principals as well as teachers by the school year 2014-2015.  This new evaluation system 
will provide the consistent data that school districts need to create new, or revise current, 
performance based compensation systems for both principals and teachers. 
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Teacher Salaries 
Currently, most teachers in the U.S. are compensated by means of a single salary 
schedule.  In this system, a teacher’s salary is determined by their years of experience and 
education or academic training.  Unfortunately, these factors have not been shown to 
make a significant difference in student success (Hanushek, 2007; Jerald, 2010; Rice, 
2010).  It is this argument that prompted the early performance pay systems in the 1980s 
and 1990s that offered additional incentives to teachers.  Performance pay systems were 
considered stand-alone systems.  In addition to the single salary schedule, teachers were 
able to earn extra pay for their participation in a variety of options including acquiring 
new competencies in curriculum, improving instructional skills, group action research 
projects, outstanding portfolios and completed professional development classes.  
Principal Salaries 
Principal salaries are typically determined based on a step and grade system 
similar to the teacher single salary schedule.  The step and grade system allows principals 
who receive a satisfactory grade to receive annual salary raises.  One significant 
difference between the teacher salary schedule and the principal salary schedule is that 
principals who work at different levels in an educational system-elementary, middle or 
high school- are typically paid differently.  Performance pay for principals does exist 
although it is generally for extra duties performed, for additional knowledge training or 
for achieving school improvement goals (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010).  
Performance Pay 
The research on performance and merit pay systems in education is inconclusive.  
According to Eric Hanushek (2007),  “merit pay” has not worked and cannot work.  
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Merit pay plans involve very small amounts of money and are evaluated based on their 
ability to get more effort out of existing teachers.  Current researchers agree that in order 
for performance pay to work in the future it must be connected to the salary structure, 
must offer substantial monetary incentives and must be evaluated with data to determine 
its effectiveness (Jerald, 2010).  Colorado school districts seem to be moving in just this 
direction. The political climate in Colorado is supportive of holding both teachers and 
principals accountable for the academic achievement and growth of their students.  
Colorado Senate Bill 10-191, also referred to as the Educator Effectiveness Bill, will 
require every school district in the state of Colorado to plan, develop, implement and 
assess a system to evaluate the effectiveness of all licensed employees including teachers 
and principals.   
The General Assembly of the State of Colorado requires that at least fifty percent 
of a teacher’s evaluation be determined by student achievement data and fifty percent of 
the principal evaluation be determined by the academic growth of the students enrolled in 
the principal’s school.  In addition, the teacher and the principal will be evaluated against 
new quality standards.  This new evaluation system will make it easier for school districts 
in Colorado to design systems of compensation that financially compensate teachers and 
principals based on data from the performance of their students and schools.  With 
teacher and principal salaries on the line, the success of implementing a new teacher and 
principal evaluation system is very high stakes. 
Conceptual Framework 
Policy makers, politicians, state and local education agencies and school district 
officials spend a lot of time creating education policy.  But according to Davis, Ellett, & 
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Annunziata (2002), most teacher evaluation policies and practices have done little to 
improve teaching, learning and schools.  The success of education policy depends on 
whether or not the policy is grounded in strategies that are proven to make a difference in 
student achievement and the successful implementation of that policy.  When it comes to 
the implementation of teacher evaluation policies, the responsibility falls to the local 
implementer, the school principal. The school principal is held accountable for 
interpreting the new teacher evaluation tool, translating it into action and leading the 
teachers toward success.  The active support of the principal for the evaluation policy is 
necessary since the principal influences his/her teachers’ attitudes toward the policy 
(Tuytens & Devos, 2010).  Principals are critical to every aspect of a school.  They can 
influence a school and community through the decisions that they make.  Principals are 
initiators, innovators, motivators, calculators and communicators.  Principals are 
indispensable when it comes to the effective implementation of educational policy (Hope, 
2002a).    
Empirical research on policy implementation indicates that it is incredibly 
difficult to implement a policy when there are layers of government and institutions 
involved (McLaughlin, 1987).  The success of policy implementation depends on 
capacity and will.  Capacity can be accomplished through training.  For example, 
principals can receive training on new evaluation standards.  The principal’s will, or their 
underlying attitudes, motivations and beliefs are less amenable to policy intervention 
(McLaughlin, 1987).  With a high stakes policy such as teacher evaluation that will lead 
to adjusting teacher and principal salaries, successful implementation is critical (Hope, 
2002b).   
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Statement of the Problem 
Although teacher performance based compensation has been tried in various 
forms for years, implementing such a data driven system for teachers and principals is 
relatively new for most school districts.  Principals have been recognized for decades as 
important contributors to the effectiveness of schools.  In fact, there is clear evidence that 
principals can substantially impact the quality of teaching and learning in their schools 
(Camburn, Huff, Goldring, & May, 2010).  In a system where a school principal is the 
local implementer for education policy, it seems critical to determine the principals’ 
attitudes related to performance-based compensation systems, both for themselves as well 
as the teachers in their schools.  By understanding the principals’ attitudes and concerns 
related to performance-based compensation, school districts can work to create plans that 
minimize those concerns. 
While much research has been conducted regarding teachers attitudes related to 
performance pay, very little research has been conducted to determine principal’s 
attitudes (Goldhaber, 2007).  Although there have been studies that have captured 
administrators attitudes, such as the study conducted by the American Association of 
School Administrators entitled Exploring the Possibility and Potential for Pay for 
Performance in America’s Public Schools (Ellerson, 2009), principals’ attitudes have 
never been separated from the attitudes of other administrators such as superintendents, 
assistant superintendents and directors.   
Data regarding teacher salaries including pay for performance incentives is 
collected through national survey instruments (Gilpin, 2012).  Unfortunately, the same 
data is not collected for principals.  In addition, school districts have worked 
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independently to develop performance based compensation systems for teachers and 
principals.  This work in isolation has resulted in a wide variety of programs and 
components being offered around the nation.  The state of Colorado has created a 
common set of expectations and standards for principals and teachers.  With the 
recommendations from the Colorado Educator Effectiveness Council, licensed personnel 
evaluations will be based on more consistent criteria, including student achievement and 
growth data, therefore making performance based compensation systems easier to 
implement and assess.   
The performance based compensation systems being discussed in Colorado, 
however, are much different than the performance pay systems of the past.  Because the 
new Colorado evaluation system requires that fifty percent of a licensed personnel 
evaluation must be directly linked to student achievement and growth, these new 
compensation systems are predicted to significantly alter the current single salary 
schedules.  For example, Denver Public Schools beginning in 2008 implemented a 
performance pay system that they call Pro-Comp.  If a teacher opts in to the Pro-Comp 
system, approximately twenty percent of the teacher’s salary will be determined by 
student and school assessment data.   In addition, a teacher’s evaluation could change his 
or her salary by one to three percent.  Denver has also recently created the Principal 
Incentive Pay system that will financially award principals for meeting a variety of 
criteria including student achievement, student growth, documentation of best practices, 
and submitting effective Unified Improvement Plans to the state of Colorado.  By 
surveying principals statewide regarding their attitudes of performance based 
compensation systems in Colorado, school districts and school boards across the state 
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would be able to use data to inform the creation, implementation, revision and assessment 
of such systems for both teachers and principals.  Just as stakeholder input is critical to 
the development of the new Colorado evaluation system (The State Council for Educator 
Effectiveness, 2011), in order to achieve maximum success, stakeholder input from the 
individuals responsible for implementing the system should be gathered regarding the 
development and implementation of performance based compensation systems as well.   
Objectives of Study 
The main objective of this study is to determine the attitudes of school principals 
regarding a performance based compensation system for teachers and principals.   This 
study will also attempt to identify principals’ attitudes towards specific factors that 
should be considered in the implementation and administration of a system of 
performance based compensation.  The data will be analyzed to determine if a principal’s 
demographic characteristics affect his/her level of agreement with performance-based 
compensation and the factors for implementation.  Finally, this study hopes to unveil any 
areas of concern that principals may have, related to the implementation of a performance 
based compensation system. 
Research Questions 
In an effort to understand school principals’ attitudes toward performance based 
compensation, the following research questions were investigated:  
1. What are principals’ attitudes towards identified factors in the 
implementation of a performance based compensation system for teachers 
and principals?  
10 
2. Is there a correlation between a principal’s demographic characteristics 
and his/her level of agreement with performance-based compensation and 
the factors for implementation?   
3. What are the areas of concern that principals have regarding the 










Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The History of Teacher Compensation 
Single salary schedules. 
Over the past 200 years the salary structures for educators have only experienced 
three significant changes.  In the 1800s, teachers received room and board in exchange 
for their teaching services.  The second shift in teacher salaries began in the 1900s.  At 
that time teachers were paid according to the position that they occupied.  Elementary 
teachers were paid less than secondary teachers due to the increased education 
requirements for secondary teachers (Protsik, 1996).  Also during this time, teacher pay 
was the victim of bias as females and minorities were paid less than white males. In the 
20th century, the single salary structure was created.  The introduction of the single salary 
schedule in the 1950s was the third major salary revision for teachers.  The single salary 
schedule calculated years of experience, education units and advanced degrees into the 
formula for determining teacher salaries.  
Public K-12 schools most commonly use the single salary schedule.  Charter and 
private schools frequently often offer contracts to teachers that do not follow a schedule.  
Higher education institutions, unlike the public school system, often have collective 
bargaining agreements that allow for differences in salaries depending on the field of 
expertise and external labor market conditions (Rhoades, 1998).  It is common for higher 
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education to adjust salaries of the most senior faculty members that they want to keep 
from transferring to other institutions.   
The single salary schedule is unique to education.  In no other profession is an 
employee given the same rate of pay for any position in the field and for whether or not 
they are productive in that position.  For example, in the field of medicine, doctors are 
offered different rates of pay depending on their area of specialty and their level of 
success.  A doctor with proven success is paid more in a hospital than one who does not 
have the same rate of success (M. Podgursky & Springer, 2011).  The same is true in the 
world of business; employees are often paid salaries commensurate with their 
productivity. 
Although the single salary schedule has been around since the 1950s, researchers 
have identified many problems with it.  The single salary schedule was created with the 
teacher in mind, not the student.  This salary schedule pays the teacher who has students 
that show outstanding academic successes the same as the teacher who repeatedly moves 
along students who are failing.  Raising teacher salaries provides incentives for both good 
and bad teachers.  In addition, the rigidity of the single salary schedule has been found to 
influence teacher shortages, unequal distribution of quality teachers and a lack of 
incentive for effective teachers to stay on the job.  According to Michael Podursky and 
Mathew Springer (2011), if a compensation scheme could induce highly effective 
teachers to stay and ineffective teachers to leave, workforce quality and student 
achievement would improve.   
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Career ladder pay. 
According to Mid-continent Research for Education and Learning (2002), there 
are three different types of career ladder programs: performance based, job enlargement 
and professional development.  As teachers demonstrate different levels of competencies 
they can earn more pay in the career ladder program.  For example, moving from a 
novice or probationary teacher to a regular status or professional teacher and then onto a 
master teacher can offer different rates of pay.  When teachers assume additional 
responsibilities such as mentoring new teachers, working on district committees or 
supervising other employees, they are eligible for job enlargement pay increases.  Finally, 
as teachers gain more knowledge by taking additional classes, obtaining advanced 
degrees or achieving National Board Certification, many districts recognize these 
achievements with professional development pay (Reichardt, Mid-continent Research for 
Education and Learning (Organization), & National Center for Education Statistics, 
2002).  
Although the intended purpose of career ladders is to offer all teachers the 
opportunity for growth, the critics of career ladders argue that in reality, career ladders 
promote competition instead of collegiality.  They promote excellent teachers out of the 
classroom where they no longer are able to directly affect student achievement.  In 
addition, career ladders are expensive to maintain and thus in tough budget times are one 




Types of performance pay. 
After the release of A Nation at Risk report in 1983, school districts across the 
United States began considering performance pay systems as an alternative or 
supplement to the single salary schedule. In addition to the single salary schedule, 
teachers were able to earn extra pay for their participation in a variety of options 
including acquiring new competencies in curriculum, improving instructional skills, 
group action research projects, outstanding portfolios and completed professional 
development classes.  Some examples of performance pay include: knowledge and skills 
pay, group incentive rewards, outstanding or master teacher designations, individual or 
group awards for school growth, individual or group awards for school achievement, and 
individual or group awards for working in a high needs school (Chamberlin, Wragg, 
Haynes, & Wragg, 2002). 
Knowledge and skills pay, similar to the professional development career ladder, 
is one way to differentiate pay for teachers.  As the trend in education moved to increased 
accountability and standards, the knowledge and skills pay system was put in place to 
compensate teachers for acquiring specific knowledge and skills required to meet higher 
expectations of performance (Reichardt et al., 2002).  This approach provides teachers 
stipends for completing selected classes and/or an increase in base salary for acquiring 
and demonstrating skills that are necessary for improving student achievement.  Through 
formal and informal observations, school principals use a standards based teacher  
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evaluation to assess a teacher’s performance against a standard set of skills that define a 
competency model of effective teaching (H. G. Heneman III, Milanowski, Kimball, & 
Odden, 2006a). 
Some research has unveiled positive results when a standards based evaluation 
system is coupled with knowledge and skills pay (H. G. Heneman III, Milanowski, & 
Kimball, 2007).  One study suggests that the scores from standards-based performance 
evaluation systems can have a substantial positive relationship with student achievement 
and that the instructional practices measured by these practices contribute to student 
learning.  Results like these encourage researchers that a system of knowledge and skills 
pay used with a rigorous standards-based evaluation could be potentially useful (H. G. 
Heneman III, Milanowski, Kimball, & Odden, 2006b).  However, all educational 
professionals do not like the knowledge and skills pay system.  Administrators report that 
to provide evidence to support a teacher’s acquisition of skills creates an increased 
workload for them. For some teachers, familiarity and comfort with the single salary 
schedule, aversion to performance pay, fears of pay fluctuations and uncertainty, 
skepticism about the stability and survival of funding for the pay program, and lack of 
self-confidence and assistance for meeting high performance standards all combine to 
make a knowledge and skills pay program a less than welcome addition to their 
educational lives (H. G. Heneman III, Milanowski, Kimball, & Odden, 2006b). 
Group incentive awards are available in some districts to teachers who 
collaboratively design action research projects.  Groups of teachers who set and meet 
performance goals are eligible for a one-time bonus. Typically, a district board reviews 
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the end of year report submitted by each teacher group and determines the amount of 
award to be given.  Financial awards are typically divided from a finite budget between 
the numbers of participating teachers (Reichardt et al., 2002). 
In some school districts, teachers who are considered master teachers or 
outstanding teachers are eligible for financial awards.  Those teachers earning the 
National Board Certification are awarded a yearly bonus in this system.  Other teachers, 
who meet certain criteria through the submission of teaching portfolios, could be also 
eligible for a yearly bonus.   
Motivation Theory. 
If teachers are more motivated, they will improve their instructional practice and, 
in turn, student achievement will improve.  At least that was one theory for implementing 
performance pay.  Therefore, much of the research that has evaluated performance pay 
systems have looked most closely at motivation theory.   Researchers have wanted to 
know if performance pay incentives motivate teachers to improve instruction and 
ultimately improve student achievement.  The results of this research are mixed.  Carolyn 
Kelley (1999) reports that if the performance pay system is based on clear goals and 
collaboration, it can motivate some individuals directly and can also create intrinsic 
rewards that are likely to enhance teaching practice, opportunities for professional 
development and collaboration around curriculum and instruction (Kelley, 1999).  
However, in the same study, only one out of five teachers indicated that money was an 
important motivator for them.  This is not surprising considering the old adage that 
claims teachers don’t go into the profession for the money.   
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In a Gallup poll conducted in 2010, 72 percent of public school parents and 71 
percent of adults nationwide believe that each teacher should be paid based on the quality 
of his/her teaching as opposed to the standard pay scale (Prince, Koppich, Azar, Bhatt, & 
Witham, 2010).  The difficulty has been in defining what makes an effective teacher and 
showing that an effective teacher can be directly linked to student achievement data.  
Performance pay plans of the 1980s and 1990s focused on identifying and rewarding 
teacher behaviors that were thought to lead to student achievement.  By looking at 
identified characteristics of good teachers, a common measurement for the basis of 
performance pay seemed possible.  In the 21st century, the emphasis in performance pay 
is moving from providing awards for good teaching to providing awards for student 
learning. Although policy makers have strived for years to connect performance awards 
to student achievement, it is not until recently that consistent assessment measures are 
starting to become available. Most district and state information systems have been 
simply insufficient to manage the data necessary to administer a teacher pay-for-
performance program that is grounded in student data. According to research gathered by 
the Data Quality Campaign, a national organization supporting states in their efforts to 
use high-quality data to improve student achievement, data systems in only 11 states meet 
all 10 of what they define as essential elements of a data system for school districts.  The 
data obtained from district and state information systems also are often riddled with 
inaccuracies and errors that can wreak havoc on the operation of a performance pay 
program.   These types of errors have the potential to completely undermine even the 
most well-designed pay-for-performance program (Burns & Gardner, 2010).   
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Teacher attitudes regarding performance pay. 
Teacher attitudes towards performance based compensation is varied.  Numerous 
studies have been conducted since the early 90s and have produced mixed results.  When 
asked the right way, most teachers will agree that hard working educators should be 
financially rewarded (Prince et al., 2010).  Dan Goldhaber (2010) argues that the polls 
conducted do not take individual and workplace characteristics into account.  A teacher 
working at an inner city, hard to staff school, with no performance pay available to him 
may have a very different attitude on the subject than a suburban elementary school 
teacher who receives several performance pay opportunities.  However, findings 
regarding teacher attitudes about performance based compensation indicate that a few 
common attitudes do exist across research.  First, it is common for women and teachers 
with more experience to be less supportive of merit pay (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).  In 
addition, those teachers associated with a teacher’s union are also less supportive of 
performance pay.  Finally, private school teachers are typically more supportive of 
performance pay (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010).   
Specific reasons that teachers oppose or are less supportive of performance pay 
have emerged.  First, some teachers fear that the implementation of performance pay will 
create an environment of competition; therefore collaboration will be less valued.  
Collaboration is important to teachers as it often takes a collective effort to help a student 
reach his fullest potential (Darling-Hammond & Berry, 1988).   
When school districts attempt to implement performance pay instead of providing 
an increase in base pay or a competitive base pay, they are strongly opposed by teachers 
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and teacher’s unions(Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).   Although performance pay programs 
may increase a teacher’s salary for one year, they generally do not increase a teacher’s 
base salary.  Researchers have found higher levels of support for performance pay in 
school districts where teachers are already well paid and where performance pay is not 
regarded as a substitute for an across the board pay increase (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).  
Performance pay has a long history of failed programs that may cause unions to hesitate 
supporting new initiatives.  One of the earlier examples of a failed performance pay 
system occurred in Florida.  This performance pay system was cancelled by the Florida 
legislature for: consistent union opposition, a lack of communication with teachers 
regarding the purpose of the program, and a failure to reward all but a small segment of 
the state’s teachers (Darling-Hammond & Berry, 1988).  According to Marguerita 
Desander (2000), most performance pay programs have been terminated within six years 
of implementation (DeSander, 2000).   
The most commonly cited reason for teacher opposition to performance pay 
programs is that evaluations will not be fair (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).  In addition, 
teachers were more likely to support performance pay if they had a high degree of 
confidence in their principal but were less likely to support performance pay if they had a 
greater sense of trust and respect for their fellow teachers than in their principal.  This has 
not changed in the past fifteen years.  In a Public Agenda survey in 2003, fifty two 
percent of teachers believed that a performance pay program would lead to principals 
playing favorites by rewarding those teachers who are loyal to them or do not rock the 
boat (Prince et al., 2010).  According to a study conducted in 1993, teachers believe that 
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administrators can’t evaluate teachers fairly and using student achievement to measure 
student effectiveness is often objected on the grounds that achievement can be influenced 
by many factors beyond instructors’ control (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).  Within the last 
fifteen years, however, principals are continually moving away from the traditional 
classroom observation as the method of teacher evaluation to a more holistic method that 
uses a multiple data source approach including but not limited to artifacts, portfolios and 
peer evaluation (DeSander, 2000).  
Theoretical arguments for and against performance based compensation 
Performance based compensation schemes have been implemented in the private 
sector since the late 1980s.  In the late 1990s schools began to review the benefits of a 
pay system that would help improve their organization.  According to Farrell and Morris 
(Farrell & Morris, 2004), it was believed that teacher recruitment, retention and 
motivation were low because good teacher performance was not sufficiently recognized.  
Performance based compensation systems were put in place to increase motivation, 
increase teacher retention and increase teacher recruitment.   
Student achievement is attributed to many variables and is influenced by many 
factors that a teacher is unable to control.  These variables and factors make monitoring a 
teacher’s performance very difficult.   Murnane and Cohen call this argument 
Performance Monitoring and explain it in an article entitled Merit Pay and the Evaluation 
Problem (Murnane & Cohen, 1986), it is more difficult to monitor teacher performance 
than any other profession because output is not readily measured in a reliable, valid and 
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fair manner.  However, since this article was published systems for student performance 
data have become much more advanced.   
Another argument that has been used against performance based compensation is 
that of team production.  It is common for students to work with more than one teacher 
throughout their day and their school year.  This team teaching approach makes it even 
more difficult to attribute a student’s learning to the contributions of a single teacher.  In 
addition as Michael Podgursky and Matthew Springer explain in Teacher Performance 
Pay: A Review, introducing performance-related rewards at the individual teacher level 
might reduce incentives for teachers to cooperate and reduce, rather than increase, school 
performance (M. J. Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
It is impossible to provide standardized testing for all aspects of learning or even 
all subject areas.  It is possible that if rewards are attached to specific areas of the 
curriculum that teachers will begin to focus on only those areas while giving less 
emphasis to secondary areas of the curriculum.  For example, if state testing occurs in 
reading, writing and math, does it mean that science and social studies should be any less 
important?  Avinash Dixit supports this theory in an article that examines incentives in 
the public sector (Dixit, 2002).  As Dixit explains, when only some of the performance of 
a worker, or in this case a teacher, is measured there can be a misalignment between the 
overall mission of the school or organization and that which is considered important 





School reforms and improvements depend crucially on the implementation of 
strategies at the school level.  The successful implementation of these strategies depends 
largely on principal leadership.  It is clear that principals have a profound influence.  
They play a crucial role in shaping their schools’ environments, which in turn influences 
the quality of teachers in them. (Goldhaber, 2007).  Given the critical role of the principal 
and the importance of compensation in determining the quality of people who choose to 
become a principal, it is important to know more about principal compensation and its 
effects on school leadership. 
Step and grade salary. 
Most school districts use a step and grade system when designing principals’ 
salary structures.  The step and grade system is similar to the teacher single salary 
schedule that is used in the majority of school districts across the nation.  Generally, the 
step and grade system guarantees a yearly salary increase for a principal who receives a 
satisfactory evaluation (Goldhaber, 2007).  The difference between the principals’ step 
and grade system and the teacher single salary schedule is that the grades that signify 
differences in pay for principals are based on the level of the school.  For example, high 
school principals earn a higher salary than elementary school principals.  For teachers, 
the steps, or increases in salary, are gained by educational attainment.  Teachers at the 





Although there is a lack of research that reviews pay for performance programs for 
school leaders, there is currently significant interest in this area.  According to the Center 
for Educator Compensation Reform (2007), the $99 million that has been appropriated by 
the federal government to support districts and states in designing new compensation 
strategies for teachers and students has created interest in over 34 districts.  These 
districts have been awarded grants under the Teacher Incentive Fund program to develop 
systems to assess and provide monetary awards based on principal performance (Kimball, 
Heneman, & Milanowski, 2007). 
Some states and districts are creating standards-based leadership evaluations, 
which will be used to evaluate school leaders and determine performance pay bonuses.  
These evaluations are based on an explicit set of standards that school principals should 
know and be able to do.  In addition to using these evaluations to determine performance 
pay, the intent is to create an evaluation system which improves school leadership 
development and accountability (Kimball et al., 2007).  Even though attaching 
performance pay to school leaders is gaining in popularity, we know shockingly little 
about whether giving principals performance incentives does in fact affect school 
performance.  In fact, basic information regarding the pay structures of principals is 
missing from research (Goldhaber, 2007). 
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Teacher Effectiveness and Evaluation 
Teacher preparation and evaluation in the USA from 1910-1950. 
By 1918, every state in the nation had passed compulsory attendance laws for 
students.  Although there was a decrease in schools across the nation due to the Great 
Depression, once World War II was over, schools showed a surge of enrollment.  At the 
beginning of this time period, teachers were chosen and evaluated based on a moralistic 
and ethical perspective (Ellett & Teddlie, 2003).  However, that began to change with the 
formation of voluntary associations working to improve teacher education and 
certification.  The National Education Association was officially formed in 1925 and 
several organizations including: The American Association of Colleges of Teacher 
Education and The National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education were formed 
soon after.  These organizations and councils were responsible for two major studies that 
investigated the qualifications and standards for teachers in public schools (LaBue, 
1960).   The first of the two studies was called the National Survey.   
The change in how states issued teacher certificates was an indication of the 
increasing expectations of teacher qualifications and the influence of the National Survey.  
By 1937, these national studies would influence the hiring qualifications of future 
teachers. No longer would teachers be hired simply for being outstanding members of the 
community who were viewed as possessing high moral and ethical standards.  In turn, 
teacher evaluations would no longer be conducted with a simple moral and ethic lens.  In 
the early 1940s philosophies and frameworks regarding teacher evaluation such as the 
Ohio Reaching Record began appearing in literature (Ellett & Teddlie, 2003). 
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Teacher preparation and evaluation in the USA from 1950-1980. 
In the 1950s and 1960s educational researchers began to focus their attention to 
teacher behaviors that resulted in student outcomes.  Although the certification 
requirements across the states continued to be greatly diverse, evaluations began to 
reflect the teaching methods used in the classrooms.  During this era, teacher evaluators 
would often use checklists that included teacher behaviors that, according to research at 
the time, were more apt to produce positive student outcomes (e.g., OSCAR, CASES, 
STARS, FLANDERS, PORS) (Ellett & Teddlie, 2003).  In addition, educational 
literature placed a large emphasis on classroom observations and evaluations. 
Throughout the 1970s classroom-based studies continued to produce theories 
regarding effective teaching practices and student outcomes.  According to Ellet (2003), 
the predominant paradigm for research on teaching became known as process-product 
research, and elements of teaching documented as important in the literature began to 
frame criteria appearing on many teacher evaluation systems.   
Educational policy and reform movements. 
Although the United States Constitution provides each state the authority to make 
decisions regarding teacher education, licensing and school curricula, national level 
policy makers beginning in 1958 have used their authority to create policies during times 
of perceived educational crisis.  These perceived times of crisis as presented through 
reports such as the National Defense Education Act (NDEA, date), the 1965 Elementary 
and Secondary Act (ESEA) and the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act 
(HEA) and A Nation at Risk: The imperative for education reform created the urgency 
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necessary to force states to abide by specific education reforms including those related to 
teacher education, certification and licensing. 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 is the most significant component of 
educational reform in the past fifty years.  This act calls for all students to achieve 
proficiency or higher in the areas of reading and mathematics by the school year 2013-
2014.  Despite all of the professional development and policy changes, many gaps in 
achievement are still evident.  In 2011, states across the nation are continuing to re-
evaluate state standards, enact increased legislation regarding teacher evaluation and 
prohibit collective bargaining.  Individual school districts are evaluating their 
compensation structures and increasing teacher accountability for student performance.   
Teacher effectiveness. 
The perception of a good teacher has evolved from the concept of teacher quality 
to the concept of teacher effectiveness.  Student achievement is the difference between 
these two terms.  A teacher can possess the characteristics of a quality teacher, yet if the 
teacher’s students do not achieve academically then the teacher is not deemed effective.  
Thus, teacher quality and teacher effectiveness are very different.  According to Laura 
Goe, teacher qualifications, characteristics, and practices are all used to define teacher 
quality and exist independently of student achievement, whereas teacher effectiveness is 
wholly dependent on student achievement (Goe & National Comprehensive Center for 
Teacher Quality (US), 2007).  The paradigm of teacher evaluation has shifted from a 
teacher-centered focus to a learner-centered focus. 
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  The theory that student achievement is most affected by an effective teacher still 
exists, however research connecting the characteristics and practices of quality teachers 
to student achievement, is limited.  Researchers use a variety of definitions for a quality 
or effective teacher and research is more likely to be found on effective teaching versus 
the effective teacher.  New legislation being passed will evaluate and compensate 
teachers, at least in part, for their students’ academic achievement.  They will be asked to 
be more than quality teachers, they will be asked to be effective teachers.   In the state of 
Colorado, the Educator Effectiveness Council crafted the following definition of an 
effective teacher. 
Effective teachers in the state of Colorado have the knowledge, skills and 
commitments that ensure equitable learning opportunities and growth for all 
students. They strive to close achievement gaps and to prepare diverse student 
populations for postsecondary success. Effective teachers facilitate mastery of 
content and skill development, and identify and employ appropriate strategies for 
students who are not achieving mastery. They also develop in students the skills, 
interests and abilities necessary to be lifelong learners, as well as for democratic 
and civic participation. Effective teachers communicate high expectations to 
students and their families and find ways to engage them in a mutually supportive 
teaching and learning environment. Because effective teachers understand that the 
work of ensuring meaningful learning opportunities for all students cannot happen 
in isolation, they engage in continuous reflection, on-going learning and 
leadership within the profession (The State Council for Educator Effectiveness, 
2011). 
 
This definition follows Laura Goe’s theory of teacher effectiveness by including teacher 
qualifications, characteristics and practices as well as an expectation for student 
achievement.  This definition will assist policy makers and school district administrators 
in the state of Colorado to establish indicators of teacher effectiveness that can be used 
within the teacher evaluation process. 
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Principal Effectiveness  
Principals are important contributors to the effectiveness of schools.  During a 
time of accountability reform and shared decision making in schools, good leadership 
matters.  Existing effective schools research tells us that effective principals influence a 
variety of school outcomes, including student achievement, through their recruitment and 
motivation of highly qualified teachers, their ability to identify and articulate school 
vision and goals, their effective allocation of resources and their development of 
organizational structures to support instruction and learning (Rice, 2010).  Principals are 
also responsible for teacher evaluation.  Even if the quality of the evaluation instrument 
being used is outstanding, if the principal does not support it, it has little meaning.  
Although the importance of the principal for the implementation of educational policy on 
teacher evaluation is widely recognized, research on the role of the principal when 
implementing and conducting teacher evaluation is limited (Rice, 2010).   
Being able to create an environment of trust and efficacy for students, teachers 
and parents is a critical role of the principal and one, which makes a difference in student 
achievement.  This critical environment helps to recruit and retain highly qualified 
teachers.  Survey and case-study research suggests that teachers greatly value competent, 
supportive, innovative and fair principals who place the well-being of students at the 
forefront of a school’s agenda (Goldhaber, 2007).  In fact, an in-depth study of Chicago 
schools revealed that the level of effective social relationships, called relational trust, in 
schools is far more important than curricular or pedagogical reforms for improving 




Although performance based compensation is not a new term, the current interest 
which links a teacher or principal’s performance more directly to student achievement is 
gaining much attention.  Research regarding the effectiveness of performance based 
compensation programs shows mixed results and has been difficult to gather due to the 
great number of variables present.  Regardless of whether or not the research supports 
that performance based compensation systems are effective, the current political climate 
continues to push the initiative forward. 
Many studies emphasize the need for stakeholder input in order for a 
compensation system to be effective.  Teachers’ attitudes have been gathered by various 
research studies and continue to be monitored by teacher unions.  However, school 
principals, who are often the sole person responsible for recruiting and retaining high 
quality teachers and for evaluating those teachers, have not had much of a chance to 
voice their opinions and concerns regarding performance based compensation systems.  
By filling this gap in the research, compensation systems will have a greater chance of 












Chapter Three: Methodology 
Purpose of the Study 
This study is concerned with identifying the attitudes of school principals in the 
state of Colorado toward performance based compensation systems that either 
significantly alter or replace traditional compensation systems for both teachers and 
principals.  Although some school districts have implemented components of 
performance pay, the degree to which traditional compensation systems are predicted to 
be changed is substantial.  Currently, little research is available regarding school 
principals’ attitudes of these types of performance based compensation systems.  This 
study is an attempt to gain data relative to the state of Colorado that can be used by state 
legislators and administrators, local boards of education, district administrators, teacher 
organizations and others who may be interested in the attitudes of principals related to 
performance based compensation systems when developing or revising such a system. 
Study Sample 
All principals in the state of Colorado who are currently employed at public 
elementary, middle and high schools were contacted to participate in this attitude survey.  
The total sample represented principals from approximately 178 school districts across 
the state of Colorado.  Because they are not subject to the same rules, regulations and 
statutes as public schools, charters, private, vocational and online school principals were 
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omitted from this study. Email addresses were obtained from school district websites 
linked from a directory located at the Colorado Department of Education website.  This 
sample included rural, suburban and urban school district principals who work in schools 
that have students from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds.    
Development of the Survey Instrument 
A review of literature revealed that several survey instruments exist that have 
been used to measure teacher attitudes related to compensation or pay for performance.  
However, an instrument specifically designed for school principals could not be located.  
Therefore, the researcher modified questions from the following surveys to be used with 
Colorado school principals:  
1. A survey designed by the American Association of School Administrators 
in a study entitled Exploring the Possibility and Potential for Pay for 
Performance in America’s Public Schools (Ellerson, 2009). 
2. A survey used to collect data regarding teacher attitudes related to 
performance pay in a dissertation written by David Anthony Sautte’ 
(Sautte, 1987). 
3. A survey designed by Catherine Farrell and Jonathan Morris in a study 
entitled Resigned Compliance: Teacher Attitudes towards Performance-
Related Pay in Schools (Farrell & Morris, 2004). 
4. A survey conducted by the National Center on Performance Incentives at 
Vanderbilt University for schools participating in the Teacher Incentive 
Fund program (Heyburn, Lewis, & Ritter, 2010). 
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The survey began with general demographic information that has been used to compare 
respondent’s attitudes based on their individual demographic characteristics.  These 
demographic categories included: gender, age, years experience, highest level of 
education, school AYP status and school location category (urban, rural or suburban). 
The following three questions from the American Association of School 
Administrators (AASA) study were identically replicated: 
1. If your district were to implement a pay for performance plan, please indicate the 
levels where you think performance pay should be included in evaluations. 
 
2. Of the system and individual indicators listed below, please mark those you 
would consider in a pay for performance model: 
 
3. What obstacles do you expect/have you experiences in implementing a pay for 
performance program? 
  
Specifically, question one was included to help identify the principal attitudes 
related to the various educator groups that the principals felt should be included if a 
performance based compensation system were to be implemented.  Question two was 
included in this study to determine the principals’ attitudes toward factors that have been 
previously identified by AASA that could be included in a system of performance based 
compensation.  Although the study conducted by AASA was designed for administrators, 
the majority of the respondents were superintendents and assistant superintendents.  By 
replicated these three questions in this research, comparisons can be made between the 
attitudes of administrators versus those of principals. 
Questions 13-23 were taken from a survey conducted by David Anthony Sautte 
(Sautte, 1987).  These questions were chosen from a list of 16 questions because of their 
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focus on possible implementation concerns.  The final survey was created using the 
Survey Monkey online surveying tool. 
To increase the validity of the survey instrument used, an expert review of the 
survey was conducted with seven experts in the field of education and compensation 
reform.  Each expert was given a draft of the survey instrument with an additional 
questionnaire to complete regarding the survey instrument.  Each expert was asked 1) 
how long it took them to complete the survey; 2) did the survey measure principal 
attitudes toward performance based compensation? (validity); 3) did the survey gather 
principal concerns toward performance based compensation? (validity); 4) if the survey 
were given to respondents a second time, would their responses be essentially the same? 
(reliability); 5) to list any other suggested questions; 6) to list any suggestions they might 
have to improve the survey.     
Once the expert review of the survey was completed, the researcher reviewed the 
feedback from the experts and revised the survey instrument.  Based on the feedback 
from the expert review, the questions on the survey were not changed.  However, the 
formatting of the survey was improved to allow the respondent more text space to enter 
their answers to the open-ended questions. All participants in the expert review reported 
that the survey took between 11-16 minutes for them to complete.  Therefore, the length 
of the survey remained the same in the final version. 
Collection of the Data 
After creating the survey using Survey Monkey, a link was created that was 
attached to an email for distribution to the requested participants of the study.  An email 
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was sent to each requested participant outlining the purpose of the study and the link 
where they may access the survey.  The survey remained open for 30 days and a reminder 
email was sent to requested participants at the beginning of each week.  Once the survey 
was closed, the data were collected and sorted using the Survey Monkey tool. 
Data Analysis Measures 




4. Standard deviations 
 
One-Way ANOVAs were used to determine analysis of variance and significant 
differences between demographic groups. 
Protection of Human Subjects 
Confidentiality of principal data is of the utmost concern for the researcher.  
Surveys were submitted electronically to Survey Monkey to ensure confidentiality.  











Chapter Four: Presentation and Analysis of Data 
This chapter is a presentation and analysis of the data that were collected in a 
manner consistent with the methodology described in Chapter Three.  This study 
investigated school principal attitudes in the state of Colorado toward performance based 
compensation systems for both teachers and principals.  Inferential statistics were used to 
identify the attitudes of Colorado principals towards factors that could be considered in 
the implementation of a performance based compensation system.  The demographic data 
that principals supplied on the survey instrument were tested against their attitudes to 
determine if correlational patterns or relationships existed between principal attitudes and 
certain demographic variables.  In addition, the principals provided open-ended responses 
regarding their concerns related to performance based compensation.  These responses 
were coded and analyzed to identify patterns and trends.   
The participants in this study completed a 21-item online survey designed by the 
researcher.  Questions included in the study were chosen and modified from previous 
research studies as outlined in the Development of the Survey Instrument section of 
Chapter Three.  Participants were asked to respond to six demographic questions and 
fourteen statements about the factors of performance based compensation.  Additionally, 
one open-ended question was included to identify concerns related to performance based 




As calculated from the Colorado Department of Education list of schools and 
districts, there are 1225 public school principals employed across the state.  Of these 
1225 principals, 47% (n=578) are male and 53% (n=647) are female.  Additionally, of 
these 1225 Colorado principals, 355 are employed in rural locations (29%), 269 
principals work in urban schools (22%) and 601 principals work in suburban schools 
(49%). 
The survey instrument was sent to 1,225 email addresses of principals identified 
from the Colorado Department of Education list of districts, schools and leaders as well 
as school district websites.  Sixty-two emails were rejected due to incorrect and/or 
changed email addresses.  A total of 1,163 surveys were successfully sent to valid email 
addresses.  A total of 444 respondents completed the survey resulting in a 38.2% 
response rate.   
Participants of the survey were closely balanced according to gender.  Of the 444 
surveys returned, 54.7% were from females (n=243) and 45.3% were from males 



















                             Survey Respondents                   Public School Principals in Colorado                  
Gender  n      %                   n  % 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Female        243    54.7%  647  53% 
 
Male         201    45.3%  578  47% 
 
No Response           0     0% 
 
Total        444    100%            1225  100% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participants were asked to identify their age based on eight choices:  (1)  under 
22,  (2)  22-28,  (3)  29-33,  (4)  34-40,  (5)  41-45,  (6)  46-50,  (7)  51-55 or  (8)  over 
55.  All respondents indicated their age.  There were no respondents that reported an age 
lower than 29 years.  Of those respondents older than 29 years, 9 were between the ages 
of 29 and 33 (2.0%).  73 respondents reported to be between 34 and 40 years of age 
(16.4%).  There were 90 respondents who reported their age between 41 and 45 (20.3%).  
Similarly, 92 respondents reported to be between 46 and 50 years old (20.7%).  
Representing the largest age group at 21.6% were 96 respondents.  Finally, 84 
















Age     n    %   
________________________________________________________________________ 
under 22       0 0% 
22-28 0 0% 
29-33 9 2.0% 
34-40 73 16.4% 
41-45 90 20.3% 
46-50 92 20.7% 
51-55 96 21.6% 
over 55 84 18.9% 
Total 444 100% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Participants were asked to indicate their number of years of principal experience 
within ranges. The smallest percentage of respondents (6.5%) reported less than one year 
of principal experience.  The largest percentage of respondents (25.9%) reported 4-6 
years of experience.  Respondents with 1-3 years of principal experience comprised 
17.3% of the total and those with 10-15 years of principal experience represented 18.5% 
of the total number of respondents.  67 respondents reported the most principal 








Total Years of Principal Experience 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Total Years of Principal Experience   n   % 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
less than 1        29     6.5% 
 
1-3         77   17.3%       
 
4-6       115                     25.9% 
 
7-9        74   16.7% 
 
10-15        82                  18.5% 
 
over 15       67   15.1% 
 
Total                 444                  100.0% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Principals were asked to indicate the highest academic degree that they had 
earned (Table 4).  Only 2 respondents reported holding only a bachelor’s degree (0.5%).  
The majority of respondents, 366 (82.4%), reported holding a master’s degree.  An 


















Highest Level of Education 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Highest Level of Education     n   % 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
master’s degree            366            82.4%  
 
advanced degree               76             17.1% 
 
bachelor’s degree     2   0.5% 
 
Total              444           100% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Principals were asked to identify whether or not their schools were making 
“Adequate Yearly Progress” (AYP) as defined in No Child Left Behind.  Only 3 (.7%) of 
the respondents did not know whether their school had made AYP.  Of the remaining 
respondents, the majority of respondents (53.6%) indicated that their school was making 
AYP whereas 45.7% indicated the opposite.  Results are displayed in Table 5.   
Table 5 
 
Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Annual Yearly Progress (AYP)   n   % 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
yes       238   53.6% 
 
no       203   45.7% 
 
I don’t know        3   0.7% 
 





In the state of Colorado, school districts can be categorized as rural, urban or 
suburban.  However, there are very large school districts that are close to urban areas but 
comprise a very large geographic region.  For the purpose of this study, large districts 
with large geographic regions are considered suburban.  In the survey, respondents were 
asked to indicate if their school district was rural, urban or suburban.  Results are 
displayed in Table 6.  167 respondents indicated that their school resides within a rural 
category.  The smallest number, 90 respondents, reported that their school was in an 






Survey Respondents                    State of Colorado       
                                                     Demographics 
Geographic Categories          n            %           n              % 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Suburban            184         41.4%        601  49% 
 
Rural             167         37.6%        355  29% 
 
Urban               93         20.9%        269  22% 
 
 
Total             444         100%       1225           100% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Performance Based Compensation Factors 
Participants were asked to respond to a hypothetical question that stated, “If your 
district were to implement a pay for performance plan, please indicate the levels where 
you think performance pay should be included in evaluations.”  A total of 410 
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participants responded to this question and 82.4% of them indicated that all three levels 
(teacher, principal and administrator) should be included (Figure 1).  52 respondents 
(12.7%) indicated that performance pay should be included in only teacher evaluations.  
14 believed that performance pay should only be for principals and 6 indicated that it 
should only be for administrators.  34 respondents chose not to respond to this question.   
Forty respondents provided comments in this section regarding the educational 
levels that should be included in a performance based compensation system.  Fifteen 
respondents provided comments that showed their disagreement with the implementation 
of a system for performance based compensation.  For example, one respondent wrote, 
“Pay for performance is an ineffective change strategy.”  Other comments included, “I do 
not have a positive attitude toward pay for performance on any level,”  “I am opposed to 
pay for performance unless it is for bonuses only.  I don’t believe it should be part of the 
regular salary,” “Do not support pay for performance-encourages competition between 
schools and teachers instead of collegiality” and “None.  Chasing financial incentives 
may not result in decisions that are best for students.” 
Seven of the respondents indicated that their district already had a pay for 
performance plan.  Out of these seven comments, three indicated that their current plan 
includes teachers, principals and administrators.  The other four of these respondents did 
not indicate which levels were currently included in their PBC systems. 
Nine comments were left in this section that indicated only teachers and principals 
should be included in a PBC system.  This option was not provided in the structured 
question on the survey.  Finally, 3 comments were made that indicated classified support 
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staff should also be included in a system for performance pay.  Overall, 25% of these 
comments seemed to have a neutral attitude towards performance based compensation, 
35% were more positive towards PBC in that they indicated additional educator groups 
that should be included in such a system and 40% were negative comments towards 
performance based compensation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Participants indicated the job groups that should be included in performance 
based compensation plans.   
 
Participants were asked to consider individual factors that should be considered in 
a performance based compensation model.  Out of 410 respondents to this question, 
88.5% (n=363) indicated that student achievement should be considered.   All question 
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options were selected by at least 50 respondents.  Including teacher grievances as part of 
a performance based compensation model was the least favored as only 12.2% of the 
respondents selected this option.  In addition to the listed options provided by the 
researcher, respondents were able to provide additional commentary.   
Respondents left a total of 48 comments for this question on the survey.  Other 
factors that were suggested by the respondents included: student growth (n=23), progress 
toward individual or school goals, professionalism, principal standards and high needs 
population considerations.  The following comments are representative of the comments 
left in this section: “I believe that student achievement should be measured by more than 
CSAP scores,” “Student achievement measured in growth,” “Achievement as measured 
by the growth model,” “student growth, regardless of proficiency level”. “I have issues 
with all of them.  Concerned about the level of reliability,” “None of the above can be 
effectively measured and linked to educator,” “none of the above…each will simply 
game the system and detract from the purpose of education,” are a few of the quotes left 
by the 9 respondents who expressed their disapproval with performance based 





Figure 2. Participants indicated factors that should be considered in a pay for 
performance program. 
 
Participants were asked to identify the obstacles that they have either experienced 
or believe they would experience in the implementation of a pay for performance 
program.  According to the participants who answered the question (n=410), their three 
largest identified obstacles are:  the capacity to link teacher evaluation and/or student 
achievement to evaluations (82.9%), teacher union resistance (67.1%) and cost (55.9%).   
A total of forty respondents left comments in the section provided for this 
question, respondents indicated that there is currently a lack of clean data available for all 
employee groups (n=9).  For example, one respondent replied, “I think there are issues 
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even with student growth-really, at least at the middle school level, there are multiple 
teachers who should be instructing students in reading and writing, not just the English 
teacher-how do we decide how to weight this?”  Additionally, some respondents (n=6) 
were concerned that demographic differences between schools and districts would cause 
unfair pay for performance results. Comments included,  “Schools with high poverty/high 
mobility/ELI population make slower growth,” “Socio-economic disparity between and 
among schools,” and “Differences in academic achievement and student behavior that are 
inherent with demographic differences.”  Six respondents indicated that they did not 
answer the question because they do not believe a pay for performance program should 
be considered at all.  Finally, three respondents indicated that they have concerns that a 
pay for performance system would lead to competition rather than collaboration.  For 
example, “These systems will create an adversarial relationship within an environment 
that needs collaboration and team synergy to meet the needs of students,” was one of the 




Figure 3.  Participants identified the concerns that they would have in implementing a 
performance based compensation system. 
 
Principal Attitudes Regarding Performance Based Compensation 
Participants were asked to respond to a series of statements regarding 
performance based compensation and indicate their level of agreement or disagreement 
using a 5 point likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  Results 













Performance Pay Statements 
________________________________________________________________________ 









1.  Administrators should be 
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is difficult to link the work done 













9.  PBC will have a positive 
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The results reported in Table 7 show a clear difference between the questions that 
deal with the results or effects of performance based compensation and those questions 
that deal with the more concrete factors that may be included in performance based 
compensation systems.  For example, the percentage of undecided responses from 
questions 1-5 and 8 range from 7.8% to 21%.  These questions all have to do with the 
factors or individual indicators that may be included in a PBC system. However, in the 
questions 6,7,9,10 and 11, principals are asked to give their perception on the results or 
effects that might occur in a PBC system.  In these areas many more respondents reported 
that they are undecided.  For example, when asked if PBC will result in better or more 
effective teaching, will result in a lack of collaboration among teachers, will lead to 
improved student achievement or will have a positive impact on teacher recruitment, the 
percentage of principal respondents in the undecided category ranged from 31.5% to 
33.7%.   
 
Analyzing the Relationship Between Attitudes and Demographics 
ANOVAs were run by the demographic categories of: years of experience, 
highest level of education, AYP status of school and school region to determine if the 
responses to the survey differed by demographic characteristics.  Results are considered 
significant at p < .05.  Although all eleven attitude items were run by the demographic 
categories listed above, only the categories of AYP status and school region produced 
significant differences in results. 
Principals were asked to indicate whether or not the school in which they 
currently work has met Annual Yearly Progress as required by No Child Left Behind.  
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Although ten out of the eleven attitude questions produced no significant differences 
between those principals whose schools met AYP (AYP principals) versus those 
principals whose schools did not meet AYP (No AYP principals), question number 2 did 
produce significant differences.  Question 2 states, “My teachers trust me to give them a 
fair and reasonable evaluation.”  A significantly greater percentage of respondents in 
schools meeting AYP agreed with the statement.  The mean of the “AYP principals” was 
4.22 and the mean of the “No AYP principals” was 4.02.  Complete ANOVA results or 
question 2 as compared to AYP status are reported in Figure 4. 
 










Figure 4.  A significant difference of means was discovered between principals in 
schools that met AYP versus principals in schools that did not meet AYP. 
 
 
The largest number of significant differences of mean occurred when the principal 
attitudes were divided by the principal’s school region and then compared to each other.  
Principals were asked to identify whether the school in which they currently work would 
be considered rural, urban or suburban.  A significant difference between these three 
Column n Mean Std. Error 
Yes 215 4.2232556 0.04045055 
No 193 4.0207253 0.05034346 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 1 4.1717296 4.1717296 10.01013 0.0017 
Error 406 169.20082 0.4167508   
Total 407 173.37254    
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groups was found in statement 3 (Self-evaluations should be included in rating teachers 
and principals for PBC).  In questions 6, 9, 10 and 11, a one-way ANOVA test showed 
significant differences between the regions.  Post hoc analyses using the Scheffe post-hoc 
criterion for significance indicated that there is a significant difference of means between 
the urban group as compared to both the suburban and rural groups. (figure 5)  
 
Figure 5: Scheffe post-hoc comparison shows significant difference identified between 
the urban and suburban group as well as the urban and rural group. 
 
Principals in all 3 region groups tend to have similar attitudes regarding the 
evaluation system that they use with teachers and the evaluation system that their 
supervisors use with them.  However, differences in attitudes occur when principals 
respond to the idea that self-evaluations should be included in rating teachers and 
principals for performance based compensation.  As shown in Figure 6, principals in 
suburban areas (M=4.08) tend to more strongly agree that self evaluations should be 















Figure 6: Principal attitudes about including self-evaluations into PBC systems as 
compared by region (rural, urban, suburban) 
 
 
In the following four questions, the principal respondents in the rural and 
suburban groups show no significant differences in mean (Figures 7,9,11 and 13).  
However, the ANOVA results comparing all 3 groups uncover significant differences of 
mean between the urban principals versus the rural and suburban principals.  Principals in 
the urban regions tend to disagree with the rural and suburban principals about whether or 
not PBC will result in a lack of collaboration among staff.  Figure 8 shows the ANOVA 
results for question 6.  Although many principals overall indicated that they were 
undecided in regards to this question (n=133), principals in urban areas tended to disagree 
more strongly than principals in either suburban or rural areas.  Although a t-test is the 
more traditional statistic to use with two variables, the researcher chose to use a one-way 
ANOVA when comparing the rural and suburban groups throughout the study to provide 
consistency in reporting results. 
Column N Mean Std. Error 
rural 158 3.8607595 0.07429876 
urban 83 3.7108433 0.107778735 
suburban 166 4.0783134 0.071998015 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 2 8.345447 4.1727233 4.7091613 0.0095 
Error 404 357.97888 0.88608634   
Total 406 366.3243    
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Figure 7. ANOVA results show no significant difference in mean between the rural and 
suburban groups for question 6. 
 
 











Figure 8. Principal attitudes about whether or not PBC will lead to a lack of collaboration  
when compared by region (rural, urban, suburban). 
 
 
Another area where principals disagree depending on their region is on question 
9, which states that Performance Based Compensation will have a positive impact on 
teacher recruitment.  ANOVA results for question 9 comparing all 3 groups are displayed 
Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 159 2.8930817 0.08398141 
suburban 164 2.871951 0.09036954 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 1 0.036046218 0.036046218 0.029256713 0.8643 
Error 321 395.49338 1.2320665   
Total 322 395.52942    
Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 159 2.8930817 0.08398141 
urban 83 2.4578314 0.12862574 
suburban 164 2.871951 0.09036954 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 2 11.936245 5.9681225 4.733661 0.0093 
Error 403 508.09576 1.2607836   
Total 405 520.03204    
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in Figure 10.  Urban and suburban principals tend to largely disagree on this statement.  
Suburban principals show the strongest level of disagreement in this area (M=2.98).   
 












Figure 9. ANOVA results showing no significant differences of mean between the rural 
and suburban groups for question 9- Teacher Recruitment. 
 










Figure 10.  Principal attitudes regarding whether or not PBC will have a positive impact 
on teacher recruitment as reported by region.   
 
Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 161 3.0248446 0.08025111 
suburban 167 2.9820359 0.08255753 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 1 0.15022232 0.15022232 0.13801022 0.7105 
Error 326 354.84674 1.0884869   
Total 327 354.99695    
Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 161 3.0248446 0.08025111 
urban 81 3.382716 0.11050934 
suburban 167 2.9820359 0.08255753 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 2 9.513802 4.756901 4.450183 0.0123 
Error 406 433.98254 1.0689225   
Total 408 443.49634    
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Overall, more principal respondents agree than disagree that performance based 
compensation will lead to better and more effective teaching.  There is no statistically 
significant difference between the rural and suburban groups on this question (Figure 11).  
However, when the urban group is compared to either the rural group or the suburban 
group, a statistically significant difference appears (Figure 12).  Principals in urban 
schools agree to a stronger degree that performance based compensation systems will 
lead to better and more effective teaching.   













Figure 11. The chart above shows that there is no statistically significant difference 

















Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 158 3.1392405 0.083495915 
suburban 167 3.1137724 0.08121221 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 1 0.052660093 0.052660093 0.047808893 0.8271 
Error 323 355.77502 1.1014707   
Total 324 355.8277    
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Figure 12. ANOVA results show a significant difference between the urban versus 
suburban or rural groups regarding whether or not PBC will result in better and more 
effective teaching. 
 
Lastly, question 11 also produces results that show a significant difference 
between the urban versus rural and suburban groups (Figure 14), but no significant 
difference between the rural and suburban groups themselves (Figure 13).  Urban 
principal respondents tend to agree to higher level that performance based compensation 

















Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 158 3.1392405 0.083495915 
urban 81 3.493827 0.1026252 
suburban 167 3.1137724 0.08121221 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 2 8.817956 4.408978 4.1903915 0.0158 
Error 403 424.02194 1.0521636   
Total 405 432.8399    
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Figure 13.  This figure shows that there is no significant difference between the rural and 
suburban groups in regards to question 11. 
 
Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural, Urban and Suburban and Student Achievement 











Figure 14.  This figure shows that there is a significant difference of means between the 
rural and suburban groups as compared to the urban group in regards to question 11. 
 
Performance Based Compensation Concerns-Open Ended Comments 
The third research question presented in this study states, “What are the areas of 
concern that principals have related to the implementation of a performance based 
Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 158 3.1455696 0.08318517 
suburban 167 3.1616766 0.07845514 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 1 0.021063035 0.021063035 0.019876208 0.888 
Error 323 342.28662 1.059711   
Total 324 342.30768    
Column n Mean Std. Error 
rural 158 3.1455696 0.08318517 
urban 83 3.4578314 0.09892339 
suburban 167 3.1616766 0.07845514 
Source df SS MS F-Stat P-value 
Treatments 2 6.130569 3.0652845 3.0361297 0.0491 
Error 405 408.88904 1.0096025   
Total 407 415.01962    
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compensation system?” On the survey, principals were asked to list and prioritize their 
top 4 concerns related to performance-based compensation.  A total of 299 (67%) 
participants contributed at least one concern.  254 (57%) participants listed a second 
concern.  176 (40%) participants contributed a third concern and 93 (21%) participants 
contributed a fourth concern.  Keeping each priority list separate, the researcher read 
through each of the 822 listed concerns and coded the responses identifying the common 
themes for each priority.  Priority one concerns resulted in 14 themes being identified 
(Table 9).   
Priority two concerns, shown in Table 10, were the same as priority one although 
in slightly different order.  For example, concerns regarding collaboration versus 
competition were the third most popular concern under priority two when they were the 
fifth most popular concern in priority one.  In addition, an addition theme emerged in 
priority two.  5 respondents listed comments in the priority two section that dealt with a 
concern regarding the lack of teacher buy-in, understanding and support. 
The same process was used to evaluate priority three and priority four concerns.  
Each of these levels produced additional themes as well.  Three additional themes 
emerged in the priority three section of the survey including: (a) evaluation process for 
principals, (b) principal trust, (c) worry about losing job and/or pay.  Administrator buy-
in emerged as an additional theme in the level four priority.   
Finally, the concerns from all four priorities were combined to reveal the top five 
overall themes.  The survey did not prevent a participant from entering the same concern  
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in each of the priority boxes.  However, because the response rate for each priority 
gradually decreased, the researcher assumes that this would have been a rare occurrence.  
The top 5 themes in priority order are listed in Table 11. 
Table 9 
 
Priority One Themes in Order of Frequency 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Priority One Themes in Order of Frequency 
1 Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all 
teachers/equity between teachers 
2 Concerns regarding the Evaluation. (time for principals to learn, consistency from 
school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality evaluation tool) 
3 Concerns regarding clear PBC components and “weights” 
4 Money/Costs related to PBC 
5 Collaboration v. Competition 
6 Equity among classrooms, schools and districts across the state.  Poverty, unequal 
resources 
7 Not in Favor of PBC due to philosophical/lack of research concerns 
8 PBC will lead to culture and morale issues 
9 PBC will lead to unethical practices 
10 Concerns related to fairness-fair process, fair system, fair criteria 
11 Union concerns and barriers to dismissing ineffective teachers 
12 Factors or variables out of the schools control (parent support, attendance, etc) 
13 Concerns related to teacher development and retention 























Priority Two Themes in Order of Frequency 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Priority Two Themes in Order of Frequency 
1 Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all 
teachers/equity between teachers 
2 Concerns regarding the Evaluation. (time for principals to learn, consistency from 
school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality evaluation tool) 
3 Collaboration v. Competition 
4 Equity among classrooms and districts across the state. Poverty, unequal resources 
5 Money/Costs related to PBC 
6 Culture and Morale Issues 
7 Not in Favor of PBC due to philosophical/lack of research concerns 
8 Concerns related to fairness-fair process, fair system, fair criteria 
9 Union concerns and barriers to dismissing ineffective teachers 
10 Factors or variables out of the schools control (parent support, attendance, etc) 
11 Concerns regarding clear PBC components and “weights” 
12 Will lead to unethical practices 
13 Concerns related to teacher development and retention 
14 Concerns about teachers becoming selective about which students they want in 
their classes 
15 Lack of teacher buy-in, understanding and/or support 




Top 5 Concerns By Theme 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Top 5 Concerns By Theme 
1 Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all 
teachers/equity between teachers 
2 Concerns regarding the Evaluation. (time for principals to learn, consistency from 
school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality evaluation tool) 
3 Not in Favor of PBC due to philosophical/lack of research concerns 
4 Equity among classrooms and districts across the state. Poverty, unequal resources 









Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to identify the attitudes of school principals in the 
state of Colorado towards performance based compensation systems for both teachers 
and principals.  This study was designed to address whether years of experience, highest 
level of education, AYP status or region of school were related to the principal’s 
perceptions of performance based compensation, its implementation factors and how it 
may affect education.  In addition, this study contained questions obtained from similar 
studies so that comparisons could be made between the attitudes of superintendents, 
principals and teachers regarding performance based compensation.  Most studies related 
to the attitudes of individuals toward performance-based compensation are targeted 
primarily to teachers.  Of the studies that were directed toward administrators, the 
majority of participants were superintendents or associate superintendents.  There is a 
lack of research regarding principal’s attitudes toward performance-based compensation.   
The Race to the Top grant has provided funding to states that have demonstrated a 
system for tying student achievement to teacher performance.  In addition, the grant 
encourages the states to compensate teachers and principals in new ways related to their 
effectiveness.   Performance based compensation systems have been used in various 
forms throughout Colorado school districts for years.  However, the stage is being set in 
Colorado so that new ways of implementing performance based systems of compensation 
can be considered.  The Colorado Senate Bill 12-191 and the Colorado Effectiveness 
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Council have now created standards of teacher and principal effectiveness that could 
significantly contribute to a system that differentiates pay based on performance.  The 
push towards performance based compensation is just part of the public and political 
belief that reform measures are needed to improve our educational system in the United 
States.  Mainstream media often discusses performance based compensation as a solution 
to what is currently perceived as the failing educational system. Many studies have 
emphasized that stakeholders must be supportive for new initiatives to be successful and 
school principals have been recognized repeatedly as important contributors to the 
effectiveness of schools.  The school principal is the person who is directly responsible 
for making sure teachers are following district and state policies as well as the Colorado 
Department of Education guidelines.  The school principal is the person solely 
responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the teachers in his or her school.  It stands 
to reason that the attitudes of school principals regarding performance based 
compensation would be helpful to understand when considering the implementation of a 
system that links a teacher’s effectiveness to their pay.   
In order to identify the attitudes of principals toward performance-based 
compensation, the researcher developed a 21-item online survey that was, before 
distributed, subjected to an expert review by seven individuals with a variety of 
backgrounds and experiences.  The survey link was distributed by email to public school 
principals in the state of Colorado as identified by the Colorado Department of Education 
list of districts and schools.  Individual websites were used to confirm email address.  Of 
the 1225 emails that were originally sent, 62 were rejected as invalid email addresses. 
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The Survey Monkey website was used to house the survey and it was available to 
participants from January 15, 2012 until February 15, 2012.  Three reminder emails were 
sent to participants at the beginning of each week during the time the survey was open.   
Of the 1225 principals that were asked to participate, 38% responded.  This strong 
response rate was also strongly representative of the general Colorado public school 
principal population.  55% of the principals in the state of Colorado are female whereas 
53% of the survey respondents were female.  45% of the principals in Colorado are male 
and 47% of the survey respondents were male.  In addition, the school regions were also 
similarly represented in this study with rural principals making up 29% (38% in 
Colorado), urban comprising 22% (21% in Colorado) and suburban principals 
representing 49% (41% in Colorado). 
Respondents of this survey were generous with their time.  Throughout the survey 
the respondents were able to leave comments and were prompted by open-ended 
questions.  In total, respondents left forty comments discussing the various educational 
levels that should be included in PBC, 48 comments discussing the factors that should be 
included in PBC, forty comments regarding the obstacles that they perceived are standing 
in the way of PBC and 822 comments listing their concerns about performance based 
compensation.  All of the comments were coded, analyzed and reported in chapter 4. 
Summary of Survey Results 
Overwhelmingly, principals agree that if a performance based compensation 
system is implemented in their district that it should be for all levels: teachers, principals 
and administrators.  Although, some respondents indicated that teachers should be the 
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only group included 12.7%).  In addition, several respondents indicated that if principals 
and teachers (without administrators) had been given as a choice, they would have 
selected that option.   
The principal respondents attitudes were also very clear when it came to the 
factors that they believe should be included in PBC if such a system were to be 
implemented. Student achievement and teacher evaluations were the two factors that 
were chosen by over 30% more principals than any other factor.  These results indicate 
that the respondents must agree with the criteria set forth by the Race to the Top grant, 
which encourages states to demonstrate a system for tying student achievement to teacher 
performance.  In addition to student achievement and teacher evaluations, graduation 
rates and teacher attendance were identified by over 40% of the respondents.  Student 
attendance, teacher retention and fiscal management were selected as factors for over 
30% of the respondents.  Most principals agree (87.8%) that teacher grievance issues 
should not be included as a factor in PBC.   
Colorado principal respondents also identified the obstacles that they would 
expect to experience when or if a performance based compensation system is 
implemented.  The number one obstacle identified by principals is their current capacity 
to link teacher evaluations and student achievement to an individual teachers total 
evaluation.  According to Senate Bill 10-191, fifty percent of a teacher’s total evaluation 
should be student achievement.  The state requires the individual school districts to 
develop balanced assessment systems that can be used for this purpose.  School districts 
across the state are currently working on these systems.  However, there were no 
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indications given by the principals that responded to this survey that any district or school 
in the state of Colorado currently has an assessment system that can be used reliably or 
effectively for this purpose. In fact, many principals left comments regarding their 
concerns in this area.  According to Murnane and Cohen (1986) this becomes the major 
difference between systems of performance based compensation between the business 
world and the world of education.  Teaching is a collaborative effort where many 
teachers contribute to each student’s achievement.  It is difficult to pinpoint and give 
credit to a single teacher that is responsible for the achievement of a single student.  So, 
although the principal respondents believe these two factors should be included in 
performance-based compensation if such a system is implemented, they emphasize that 
there is not a current or possibly effective system for making that happen.   
When principals were asked to speculate about how performance based 
compensation would effect education, it is clear that they are undecided.  According to 
the results of this study, the percentage of principals who think that PBC will result in 
resentment among teachers is almost exactly the same as the percentage of principals 
who are undecided (29.6% and 29.7% respectively).  In addition, there were almost as 
many principals that reported that they are unsure if PBC will have a positive impact on 
teacher recruitment (n=137) as there were that reported that they agree that it will have a 
positive impact on teacher recruitment (n=152).  Finally, although a greater percentage of 
principals agree that PBC will lead to both improved student achievement and better and 
more effective teaching, there is still a large percentage of principals that are undecided 
in these areas (31.5% and 32.6% respectively).  Further research would need to be 
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conducted to explore what caused such a large percentage of principals to be undecided 
when it comes to how PBC will effect education. 
By responding to a series of statements regarding the factors and beliefs related to 
performance-based compensation, the researcher was able to determine that the principal 
respondents have clear opinions regarding current practices and tools.  For example, they 
believe that they have been provided with the tools necessary to fairly and reasonable 
evaluate teachers in their current system.  They also believe that their supervisor has the 
tools necessary to fairly and reasonably evaluate them.  In addition, the principals in this 
study agree that their teachers trust them to evaluate them fairly.  
The principal respondents provided a total of 822 statements of concern. Fourteen 
separate themes were identified from these statements.  The top five concerns were: 
1. Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure 
performance of all teachers/equity between teachers 
2. Concerns regarding evaluation (time for principals to learn, 
consistency from school to school, time for principals to evaluate, 
quality of evaluation tool). 







4. Concerns regarding the equity between classrooms and districts across 
the state due to poverty levels and unequal resources. 
5. Concerns that performance based compensation will result in a decline 
in teacher collaboration and an increase in competition between 
teachers. 
These findings indicate that there is not a strong general acceptance of 
performance based compensation systems by the principals who responded to this study. 
Superintendents and Teachers 
The purpose of this study was to determine the attitudes of principals in the state 
of Colorado on the topic of performance-based compensation.  Other studies have been 
completed that have studied the attitudes of other educator groups such as teachers and 
superintendents.  Several questions in this study were duplicated from the studies of other 
educator groups so that comparison data can be reported.   
In 2009, the American Association of School Administrators (AASA) completed 
a study about performance-based compensation.  The sample for this study included 
superintendents and associate superintendents.  Three questions from the current study 
were also used in the AASA study.  When superintendents were asked which educator 
groups should be included in pay for performance programs their answers were 
somewhat similar to the answers from the principals in the current study.  Comparison 
results are reported in Table 12.  The clear majority in both the superintendent and 
principal groups was the category that specified all three groups of educators should be 
included in pay for performance systems.  With 14% compared to 3.4%, the respondents 
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of the AASA study indicated to a much larger percentage that principals should be 
included in a performance based compensation system.   
Table 12 
 
Which Educator Groups Should be Included in Pay for Performance Programs 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Which Educator Groups Should be Included in Pay for Performance Programs 
Educator Group       2009 AASA Response %            2012 Principal Response %  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All 3 Levels    62%    82.4% 
 
Teacher    15%    12.7%   
 
Principal    14%    3.4% 
 
Administrator    9%    1.5% 
 
Total     100%    100% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Additionally, the AASA study asked superintendent and associate superintendent 
respondents about the individual indicators that should be included if a pay for 
performance program was developed in their districts.  Both the AASA respondents and 
the respondents of the current study agree that student achievement is the most important 
indicator to include in such a program.  Both groups’ data resulted in 89% of the 
respondents choosing student achievement.  Both the AASA respondents and the current 
study respondents also agree that teacher evaluations are the second most important 
indicator to include in a performance based program. The only difference in priorities 
between the superintendent respondents and the principal respondents is in the teacher 
retention indicator.  A greater percentage of principal respondents reported that including 
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teacher retention as an indicator in performance based programs than AASA respondents.  
Complete comparison results for the individual indicators that should be included in 
performance based compensation systems are reported in Table 13. 
Table 13 
 
Individual Indicators That Should be Included in Pay for Performance 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Individual Indicators That Should be Included in Pay for Performance 
Indicator   2009 AASA Response % 2012 Principal Response % 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Student Achievement   89%    89% 
 
Teacher Evaluations   68%    78% 
 
Graduation Rates   54%    44% 
 
Teacher Attendance   54%    44% 
 
Fiscal Management   39%    36% 
 
Student Attendance   37%    32% 
 
Student Behavior   35%    27% 
 
Teacher Retention   22%    37% 
 
Teacher Grievances   6%    12% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Respondents from the AASA study and respondents from the current study 
disagree on the most important obstacles that face the implementation of performance 
based compensation systems.  Comparison results are reported in Table 14.  The number 
one concern for the administrator respondents from the AASA study is teacher union 
resistance.  Although this was the second most concern for the principal respondents, a 
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greater percentage of principal respondents reported that the capacity to link student 
achievement to teacher evaluations would be an obstacle.  More principal respondents 






Obstacles   2009 AASA Response % 2012 Principal Response % 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Teacher Union Resistance   75%   67% 
 
Capacity to link data to evaluations  66%   83%  
 
Costs      50%   56% 
 
School System Support   20%   34% 
 
School Board Resistance   12%   12% 
 
Lack of Community Support   9%   16% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In addition to comparing the attitudes of principals to superintendents, this study 
can also be used to compare principals’ attitudes with teacher attitudes. The attitudes of 
principals can be compared to the attitudes of teachers using the questions that were 
derived from a study by Catherine Farrell and Jonathan Morris in 2004.  The current 
study and the study by Farrell and Morris have five questions in common and produced 
very different results. 
When respondents of both studies were asked to indicate their level of agreement 
with the statement that stated PBC will have a positive impact on teacher recruitment, 
83% of the teacher respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed whereas only 29% of the 
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principal respondents disagreed.  These respondent groups also disagreed with whether or 
not PBC would result in better and more effective teaching and whether PBC would 
result in improved student achievement.  77.2% of the teacher respondents disagreed with 
the statement that PBC would result in better and more effective teaching where only 
24% of the principal respondents disagreed with that statement.  73.1% of the teacher 
respondents also disagreed with the statement that PBC would result in improved student 
achievement compared to only 23% of the principal respondents disagreeing.   
Comparing the statements where the majority of respondents agreed with 
statements produced differences between the teacher and principal respondents, although 
to a slight lesser degree.  92.1% of teacher respondents agree that PBC will cause 
resentment among teaching staff.  Only 40.7% of the principal respondents agreed with 
that statement.  Finally, 93% of the teacher respondents agreed that PBC will be 
problematic because it is hard to link the work done in schools to individual performance 
compared to 59% of the principal respondents agreeing with that statement.  Complete 



















Comparing Teacher Attitudes to Principal Attitudes 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Statement                            Principals          Teachers 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
PBC will be problematic because it is 
hard to link the work done in schools  
to individual performance.  Results  
reported in % of agree/strongly agree. 59%   93% 
 
PBC will cause resentment among staff.   
Results reported in % of  
agree/strongly agree.                                     40.7%   92.1%  
 
PBC will have a positive impact on  
teacher recruitment.  Results reported  
in % of disagree/strongly disagree.  29%   83% 
 
PBC will result in better and more  
effective teaching.  Results reported 
in % of disagree/strongly disagree.  24%   77.2% 
 
PBC will result in an improvement in  
student achievement.  Results reported  
in % of disagree/strongly disagree.  23%   73.1% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Table ?? Comparing teacher attitudes from a 2004 study to principal attitudes from the 
current study.  
 
Summary of Comparisons 
When comparing the attitudes of the Colorado principal respondents to the 
attitudes of superintendents and associate superintendents targeted in the American 
Association of School Administrators study of 2009, very few differences emerge.  Both 
educator groups put student achievement and teacher evaluations at the top of their list of 
factors that should be included in PBC systems.  Although the AASA identified the 
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resistance from teacher unions as the number one obstacle for its respondents, this was 
still identified as the second most identified obstacle by the Colorado principals.  
Capacity to link data to evaluations was the most identified obstacle by the principal 
respondents.   
The attitudes of the Colorado principal respondents can also be compared to the 
attitudes of teachers from a variety of studies.  Teachers with more experience have 
shown to be less supportive of PBC in some studies.  However, other than a slight 
disagreement about whether or not PBC will result in teacher recruitment (more 
experienced principals disagree that PBC will result in teacher recruitment whereas 
principals with less experience agree), there are no significant differences among the 
principal respondents based on length of experience.  Teachers that are associated with a 
teacher’s union are generally less supportive of performance pay as well.  Although 
principals are not generally associated with teacher’s unions, the majority of principal 
respondents (67.1%) in this survey indicated that a teachers union is an obstacle to PBC.   
Specific reasons that teachers oppose performance based compensation have also 
been identified by research.  It seems that teachers and principals don’t agree on whether 
or not PBC will result in a lack of collaboration.  Whereas this has been an identified 
concern of teachers in previous studies, only 25% of the principal respondents in this 
survey agree with them.  Another commonly cited reason for teacher opposition to PBC 
is they believe the system will not be fair.  It has also been stated, however, that the 
teachers were more likely to support PBC if they had a high degree of confidence in their 
principal.  According to the majority of the principals in this study (65.2%), felt that they 
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have the tools they need to fairly and accurately evaluate teachers.  The results of this 
study could indicate that there is still a difference in perspective between teachers and 
principals on the issue of fairness, or it might be predicted that the evaluation tools 
recently developed and used by principals are increasing the trust that teachers have in 
the evaluation process. 
Demographic Differences 
When the performance based compensation statements were compared to the 
demographics: years of experience, highest level of education, AYP status and region of 
school, statistically significant differences were identified.  Principals in schools where 
AYP was met, as compared to principals in schools where AYP was not met, more 
strongly agreed that their teachers trust them to give them a fair and reasonable 
evaluation.  This is not surprising due to the research that suggests that relational trust in 
schools is a critical element in improving student achievement (Slotnik, 2010).  This 
research would support that academically struggling schools must have a lack of trust as 
compared to academically successful schools. 
More differences appear when comparing principals in this area as well.  
Principals in struggling schools tend to believe that all education levels should be 
included in a system of performance based compensation.  Principals in schools where 
AYP targets were met were twice as likely to indicate that only teachers should be 
included in PBC systems.  Finally, when looking at the factors that principals suggest 
should be included in a performance based compensation system, only 38% of the 
principals in schools where AYP targets were met suggested that graduation rates should 
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be included whereas 50% of the principals in the struggling schools indicated that they 
should be included.  Overall, principals in struggling schools expressed that the systems 
for performance based compensation should be a result of many factors, and not just 
student achievement.   
When the PBC statements were compared to the demographic category of school 
region, additional differences were identified.  Differences in attitudes regarding the idea 
that self-evaluations should be included in rating teachers and principals for performance 
based compensation were apparent between all three regions: rural, urban and suburban.  
However in the remaining statements where significant differences were uncovered, the 
rural and suburban groups had no significant difference of means with each other, only as 
compared to the urban group.  The urban region disagreed more strongly than the other 
two groups that PBC will lead to a lack of collaboration among staff.  In addition, the 
urban region agreed more strongly than the other two groups that PBC will lead to better 
and more effective teaching and that it will lead to improved student achievement.  
Although to a lesser degree, the urban principal respondents also agree more strongly that 
PBC will have a positive impact on teacher recruitment.  Ultimately, urban principals 
tend to favor performance based compensation more strongly than principals in other 
geographic locations. 
It is clear that the factors that principals believe need to be included in a 
performance based compensation system are the same things that they have concerns 
about.  When the principals that responded to this survey were given the opportunity to 
list their concerns about PBC, they provided a total of 822 comments expressing their 
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concerns.  Although a complete analysis of these open ended comments is included in 
chapter four, the top five concerns for principals were: 1) concerns related to the data that 
would be needed to effectively and equitably complete a teacher or principal’s evaluation 
for a PBC system, 2) concerns about the teacher evaluation system including a lack of 
consistency and the amount of time that it takes to create a fair and reasonable evaluation, 
3)  overall philosophical concerns related to PBC and the lack of supportive research, 4) a 
concern regarding the lack of equity between classrooms, schools and districts due to 
unequal resources and poverty, and 5) a concern that collaboration will be negatively 
affected by PBC.  Even though there were no questions on the survey that asked the 
participant to agree or disagree with the philosophy of a performance based compensation 
system; the respondents did not fail to list this as their third concern.  In fact, there were 
70 comments that showed respondents to be against performance-based compensation 
including: “great teachers motivation is not stemmed by money,” “the linkage between 
performance and pay lacks a sound theoretical underpinning,” “research really does not 
indicate that it improves student performance” and “creativity is not fostered in a pay for 
performance system.” 
Limitations 
Because the researcher in this study is currently a principal, biases may exist 
related to the role of the principal as it relates to teacher effectiveness and student 
achievement.   
This research was limited to public school principals in 178 districts across the 
state of Colorado. These districts are located in rural, urban and suburban areas that vary 
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greatly in socioeconomic status.  Therefore, the results of this study may or may not 
represent those of the greater principal population in the United States.  Additionally, 
principals across the state may different levels of understanding of performance based 
compensation systems.  Performance based compensation systems and compensation 
models vary greatly from district to district.   
Finally, the questions that were selected for this survey were based on previous 
research that may have had a negative view towards performance based compensation.  
Therefore, this survey may also be skewed negatively towards performance based 
compensation.  The researcher did not ask the participants how they feel about 
performance based compensation, only about their concerns regarding performance based 
compensation.  Therefore, results can not include the respondent’s feelings about 
performance based compensation.   
Conclusions 
All principals do not agree when it comes to performance based compensation.  
This is not surprising.  But what is surprising is that the principals from urban schools 
tend to be more favorable than suburban or rural school principals.  Considering that 
concerns regarding equity among classrooms, schools and districts due to unequal 
resources and poverty was listed in the top 5 concerns of all principals respondents, it is a 
surprising result that the principals in urban schools tend to be more favorable toward 
performance based compensation.  Urban schools tend to have higher rates of poverty 
and higher ethnic populations, which have historically been associated with lower student 
achievement.  In addition, there are reportedly a larger percentage of schools in urban 
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areas that are not making AYP targets and the schools not making AYP targets reported a 
lack of trust between teachers and principals.  Perhaps the principals in these areas are 
looking for a system that is less subjective so that trust can be increased. 
It is also worth considering that the responses that came from the principals 
working in urban schools were affected by the performance based compensation system 
that was implemented in Denver Public Schools in 2009 called ProComp.  ProComp is 
described as a groundbreaking compensation system that links teacher pay to the school 
district’s instructional mission and student achievement.  Although other forms of 
performance based compensation systems have been tried around the state, Denver Public 
Schools is the only one that has linked pay to student achievement.  It could also be 
possible that because the ProComp system has been in practice for several years that 
principals working in this system have grown to accept performance based compensation 
more than in other areas.  However, even if the urban principals responses were affected 
by ProComp, only slightly more than 40% of urban respondents reported that PBC will 
have a positive impact on teacher recruitment, will lead to better and more effective 
teaching and will lead to improved student achievement. 
Ever since the 1983 report titled “A Nation at Risk” the education system in the 
United States has seen extreme attacks by politicians, educational organizations and 
citizens alike.  Education reform is a top agenda item for politicians and is frequently 
reported in the mainstream media.  Movies such as “Waiting for Superman” have been 
created to show the problems that occur within the educational system.  States are 
beginning to put new laws into effect that drastically change how the education system 
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has historically worked.  Teacher unions are under attack as well.  Several states, 
including Wisconsin, Indiana and Ohio have passed laws that limit the collective 
bargaining rights of teacher unions.  All of this negativity has decreased teacher morale, 
has put teachers and unions on the defensive and has reduced trust in the system.  When 
Michelle Rhee, former chancellor of D.C. public schools, attempted to significantly 
change the teacher salary structure, she indicated that the purpose for the performance 
based compensation system that she was trying to implement was to reward the teachers 
who get results, while encouraging others to leave the profession.  In the past, systems of 
performance based compensation were implemented as a way of motivating teachers to 
improve their practice and increase student achievement.  However, the research on 
whether or not PBC increases teacher motivation is mixed.  The current political climate 
has seemed to dismiss PBC as a motivation booster and more often has the attitude that if 
PBC can induce highly effective teachers to stay and ineffective to leave, student 
achievement would improve.  Again, the principal respondents in this survey that are not 
meeting AYP targets report that their teachers are less likely to trust them.  With all that 
is going on at the national and local level in regards to education reform, this data is not 
surprising. 
Regardless of the driving theory, performance based compensation is being 
strongly suggested.  However, unless many changes are made with the teacher evaluation 
system and the data systems that can be used to effectively link student achievement to an  
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individual teacher’s performance, the schools in Colorado are clearly not ready to 
implement a performance based compensation system that significantly alters or replaces 
traditional compensation systems.   
Recommendations 
Although some principals appear to be more willing to accept performance based 
compensation systems in certain cases, general acceptance is not overwhelming.  If 
education policies in the state of Colorado continue to emphasize teacher and principal 
effectiveness as determined by student achievement, everyone must work together to 
solve the biggest problems that are standing in the way.  Clearly, solutions must be found 
that are equitable among the wide variety of teacher and principal groups that exist.   
When comparing the results of this study to previous studies focused on teacher 
attitudes (Farrell & Morris, 2004; Heyburn et al., 2010; Sautte, 1987), there is a clear 
difference between the perceptions of teachers versus those of principals when it comes 
to performance based compensation systems.  It is recommended that teachers be 
involved in creating new systems for linking student achievement to evaluation.  The 
teachers need to trust that the system will be fair and equitable to all.  This system must 
include a way to link student achievement to all teachers including those teachers that do 
not teach in the typically tested grades or subjects.   
In addition, mainstream media from Colorado and around the nation are 
negatively portraying teacher unions and this study also identified teacher unions as being 
a concern to the principal respondents.  The animosity that exists between teacher unions, 
district leaders, school boards and policy makers is keeping the focus on identifying what 
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is wrong instead of working on possible solutions.  It is recommended that members of 
teacher unions join together with non-member teachers when working on new data and 
assessment systems.   
Finally, further research is needed to explore the effects that current and newly 
designed performance based compensation systems are having around the state.  Many 
districts are either currently designing or thinking about designing new systems of 
compensation.  These plans and the results need to be shared with and among districts to 
increase the effectiveness of performance based compensation for the sake of all 
Colorado students.  Districts believe in collaboration for their teachers and students, now 
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Appendix A  Informed Consent Statement 
 
Informed Consent for “Survey on Principals’ Attitudes toward Performance Based 
Compensation” 
 
A. Introduction. You are being invited to participate in a study designed to investigate 
Colorado public school principals’ attitudes toward performance based compensation 
systems.  The research project is not intended to judge the effectiveness of any given 
method of paying teachers or principals, but, rather to assess principals’ acceptance of 
different pay systems.  Please read this form and ask any questions prior to completing 
the online survey.  Completion of the survey indicates that you are agreeing to participate 
in the study. 
 
B.  Participant Involvement. Your involvement in the study will be limited to 
answering the questions on this survey.  The researcher does not anticipate any other 
requirements on your behalf.  The survey will take less than ___minutes to complete. 
(The amount of time needed for the survey will be determined during field testing.) 
 
C.  Conflict of Interest.  The researcher, Carolyn Stephenson, will use data gathered 
from your responses and those of others as the basis for a dissertation as part of her 
course of study toward a Doctorate in Educational Administration and Policy Studies at 
the University of Denver.  Carolyn Stephenson is a principal in the state of Colorado, 
however, confidentiality of responses will eliminate any concern for a conflict of interest 
within the school district she is employed.   
 
D.  Risks. The researcher does not anticipate any risks as a result of participating in the 
study.   
 
E. Benefits. The information gathered will help assess the degree to which various 
groups of principals favor or disfavor certain forms of compensation.  The information 
gathered may help legislators, local school boards and school districts design and/or 
revise performance based compensation systems.   
 
F.  Confidentiality. The researcher is not asking that you include your name on the 
survey.  While there are certain demographic questions asked on the survey instrument, 
these questions are intended only to identify the extent to which individuals in various 
subgroups compare to others.  Neither the researcher nor anyone else associated with the 
study will attempt to identify individuals through responses to the demographic 
questions.  No information will be included in any published report that will make it 
possible to identify a particular subject.  Your survey will be kept confidential and will 





G. Contact Information. The project director, Carolyn Stephenson, and her advisor, Dr. 
Kent Seidel, PhD., may be contacted directly if you have any questions or concerns 
regarding this study.  Carolyn Stephenson may be contacted by email at 
carrie.stephenson@dcsdk12.org.  Dr. Kent Seidel may be contacted by email at 
kent.seidel@du.edu. 
 
H. Participation. Your participation in this study is purely voluntary.  Participation will 
be limited to the amount of time necessary to complete the survey.  By completing the 
online survey you are agreeing to have your opinions included in a statistical analysis of 
the attitudes of principals towards performance based compensation systems. 
 
I. Results. Composite results of this study will be available to you upon request. 
 
By completing this survey, you are agreeing to participate in the research realizing that 
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